【雙語(yǔ)閱讀】大張旗鼓的金融監(jiān)管改革.

　　為幫助廣大考生更好地準(zhǔn)備雅思、托福、SAT等考試，澳際留學(xué)特推出【英語(yǔ)學(xué)習(xí)】頻道，涵蓋基礎(chǔ)英語(yǔ)、實(shí)用英語(yǔ)、娛樂英語(yǔ)等多項(xiàng)內(nèi)容，在您通往成功的道路上做您最堅(jiān)實(shí)的左膀右臂。

　　以下部分為【雙語(yǔ)閱讀】?jī)?nèi)容，本文介紹大張旗鼓的金融監(jiān)管改革，中文翻譯部分見第二頁(yè)。

　　Overhauling financial regulation

　　The regulatory rumble begins

　　From The Economist print edition

　　In America and Europe, new rules are already running into stiff resistance—mostly from regulators themselves

　　“YOU want to move at the point where people still have the memory of the trauma,” Tim Geithner explained recently when asked about financial regulation. Aware that the crisis is moving into a new phase, with the emphasis shifting from firighting to working out how supervision should be restructured, America’s treasury secretary wants to seize the moment. He plans to unveil a comprehensive regulatory overhaul by mid-June. Barack Obama has said he wants to sign the changes into law by the year’s end.

　　In Europe, too, the pressure is on. “There’s no room for more delays,” José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, said on May 27th when he unveiled a blueprint for rorm of financial supervision. He announced plans to form two new grandly named institutions: a European Systemic Risk Council, which is supposed to provide early warning of possible risks, and a European System of Financial Supervisors, which would be a super-committee of regulators from across the European Union.

　　The goals of the two new institutions are admirable. Both are intended to correct a fundamental flaw in European bank regulation and supervision; namely, that although banks are free to operate across borders, they are supervised only by their home countries. Slack oversight by one country can, as the crisis has revealed, spread chaos across many. Yet it is not at all clear that the proposals have been thought through properly. “The European Commission is confusing speed with haste,” says Nicolas Véron of Bruegel, a think-tank in Brussels. “The governance, mandate and funding of these new authorities is not really addressed.” Britain, which has the biggest banking centre, is particularly concerned about the proposed rules, which may cede aspects of the City of London’s banking supervision to Brussels.

　　In America, meanwhile, the plans taking shape face resistance, partly from the bankers they will shackle but even more from regulators and lawmakers. Bankers accept they will be forced to build up bigger capital buffers, which will crimp profitability, and that the liquidity of their balance-sheets will be policed more intensively. The regulatory net will be cast over the “shadow” banking network of hedge funds, money-market funds and the like, to which much financial activity gravitated during the boom.

　　Big banks, however, still have enough lobbying power to ensure that not every decision goes against them. True, they are still licking their wounds after the recent passage of draconian credit-card rorms. But they are happier with the government’s proposals on derivatives, under which dealers will be able to continue peddling customised swap contracts away from exchanges, albeit with a higher capital charge.

　　As the crisis has deepened, American bankers have tempered their opposition to the idea of new rules that reduce the chances of another blow-up. “Would I accept regulation that slows innovation a bit and knocks three percentage points off my returns if it promised greater stability? Absolutely,” says the head of one large bank.

　　For some, more stringent regulation even has a silver lining. With tougher mortgage rules, banks will no longer have to lower their standards to compete with the industry’s unregulated parts. The survivors could also benit from higher barriers to entry.

　　On the whole, Wall Street sees a welcome disconnect between the Obama administration’s rhetoric and its actions. The Treasury is “gradually learning” how to square the circle of showing that it understands the public’s anger on the one hand, and maintaining a dynamic financial sector on the other, says one bank lobbyist. Another test of its capacity to resist pitchfork-wielding urges will come in the next few weeks, when it is expected to issue guidelines on executive pay.

　　The stiffest resistance to change is coming not from Wall Street but from Washington, DC, where government officials, regulators and congressional leaders are locked in turf wars and ideological battles. “Opinion has splintered. Everyone is fighting everyone,” says Bert Ely, a consultant on regulatory issues.

　　Even the main banking agencies are at odds with each other. Sheila Bair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and John Dugan, the Comptroller of the Currency, have fallen out over Ms Bair’s deposit-insurance rorms. Mr Dugan also opposes the FDIC’s push for sole authority to liquidate failing non-banks, as it already does with banks.

　　Worse, there is no consensus on the proposed systemic-risk regulator, which would identify and act on emerging “macro-prudential” dangers. The administration wants the Fed to assume the role, but many in Congress oppose this. Dick Shelby, an influential senator, has accused Mr Geithner of using the crisis to hand the Fed unacceptable levels of power. Meanwhile, Ms Bair has suggested that systemic regulation be done (or at least overseen) by a multi-agency council, an idea that is gaining traction even if others (including, again, Mr Dugan) worry that such supervision-by-committee is a recipe for inaction.

　　An even bigger battle is brewing over the shake-up of existing regulators. No one doubts that the archaic, overlapping patchwork of agencies needs modernising, with regulation rocused on a firm’s activities rather than its legal form. Reportedly, the White House is considering rolling the four banking-supervision agencies into one, though the idea is still in flux.

　　But an embryonic plan to create a super-regulator for consumer products, such as mortgages, credit cards and mutual funds, is already encountering stiff opposition. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which would lose out in such a shuffle, has powerful friends on Capitol Hill, especially on the Senate banking committee that oversees the agency—and any overhaul would require congressional approval. Public pension funds have also joined together to lobby against a reduction in the SEC’s power.

　　Moreover, the economically rational may not be politically feasible. Though it would make sense to merge the SEC with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which regulates derivatives, Congress’s powerful agriculture committee would probably block the move.

　　Debate about other thorny issues, such as what restrictions to place on, or whether to dismantle, banks that are too big to fail has barely begun. Congressional leaders cannot even agree on whether to pass new rules in pieces or roll them up into one mega-bill.

　　All of which explains why pundits now expect to see few, if any, further financial rorms passed in 2009. Delay could play into the financial industry’s hands, to the extent that it reduces the likelihood of heat-of-the-moment laws like Sarbanes-Oxley, rushed through after the Enron scandal. But if measures that would increase stability fall victim to politics, everyone will be worse off.

　　【中文對(duì)照翻譯】

　　金融監(jiān)管大變革

　　大張旗鼓的金融監(jiān)管改革開始了

　　摘自《經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人》雜志

　　在美國(guó)和歐洲，新的監(jiān)管制度已經(jīng)在遭受嚴(yán)重的抵制 – 而大部分的抵制來自監(jiān)管者本身

　　最近，在被問及金融監(jiān)管問題時(shí)蓋特納解釋道：“在民眾仍然對(duì)傷痛記憶深刻的時(shí)候你是想要做出改變的”。在意識(shí)到危機(jī)已經(jīng)進(jìn)行到一個(gè)新的階段，并且在一直強(qiáng)調(diào)要從救火隊(duì)員轉(zhuǎn)變到制定出監(jiān)管應(yīng)該如何改革時(shí)，美國(guó)財(cái)政部想要把握住時(shí)機(jī)。蓋特納計(jì)劃在六月中旬開始對(duì)金融監(jiān)管進(jìn)行一項(xiàng)徹頭徹尾的改革。巴拉克-奧巴馬說過他希望在年底前將監(jiān)管改革簽署為正式法案。

　　歐洲也面臨著同樣的壓力。在5月27號(hào)公布一份金融監(jiān)管改革的藍(lán)本時(shí)，歐盟主席巴羅佐稱：“已經(jīng)沒有耽擱的余地了”他宣布計(jì)劃成立兩個(gè)名字響當(dāng)當(dāng)?shù)臋C(jī)構(gòu)：一個(gè)是歐洲系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)理事會(huì)，希望它能就可能出現(xiàn)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)提供早期警示，另一個(gè)是歐洲金融監(jiān)管者系統(tǒng)，這應(yīng)該是一個(gè)匯集了全歐盟監(jiān)管者的超級(jí)委員會(huì)。

　　成立這兩個(gè)機(jī)構(gòu)的初衷是很好的。二者都傾向于修正歐洲銀行制度和監(jiān)管的基礎(chǔ)法案;也就是說，盡管銀行可以自由的進(jìn)行跨境操作，但是他們只受本國(guó)政府的監(jiān)管。就像危機(jī)所揭示的那樣，一個(gè)國(guó)家的疏忽會(huì)將混亂延伸到其它很多國(guó)家。然而，這項(xiàng)計(jì)劃的可能性有沒有被考慮過還不清楚。“歐盟委員會(huì)將速度和草率搞混淆了” 布魯塞爾的一家咨詢業(yè)巨頭Bruegel的Nicolas Véron說道，“這些新的權(quán)力機(jī)構(gòu)的管理方法，授權(quán)以及資金來源都還沒有真正的安排好”擁有最大的銀行中心的英國(guó)尤其關(guān)心被提及的這些制度，因?yàn)樗鼈兛赡軙?huì)將倫敦城銀行的部分監(jiān)管權(quán)轉(zhuǎn)交給布魯塞爾。

　　同時(shí)，在美國(guó)，監(jiān)管制度的改革遭遇了嚴(yán)酷的正面抵制，抵制部分來自會(huì)被束縛的銀行家，但是來自監(jiān)管者和法律制定者的抵制甚至更猛烈。銀行家可以接受今后被強(qiáng)制要求設(shè)立更大的資本金緩沖，雖然這樣可以抑制其收益率，他們也能接受更強(qiáng)的針對(duì)資產(chǎn)負(fù)債平衡表流動(dòng)性的管轄。監(jiān)管網(wǎng)絡(luò)會(huì)覆蓋到涉及對(duì)沖基金的灰色銀行體系，貨幣市場(chǎng)基金等等諸如此類在繁榮時(shí)期吸引了大量金融行為的方面。

　　然而，大型的銀行仍然具有足夠的游說能力來確保并非每一項(xiàng)改革決議都是針對(duì)他們的。的確，在經(jīng)歷了最近針對(duì)信用卡的嚴(yán)酷改革后他們還處在舔舐傷口的階段。但是政府關(guān)于衍生品的改革提議令銀行家們感到很高興，盡管該提議要求的資本金充足率更高，但是在這一提議下證券商可以繼續(xù)在交易所外兜售按客戶特定需求制定的掉期交易合同。

　　隨著危機(jī)的加深，美國(guó)的銀行家們?yōu)楸O(jiān)管者想到了一個(gè)辦法：制定新的制度來減少危機(jī)再次大面積爆發(fā)的可能性。一家大銀行的行長(zhǎng)稱：“我會(huì)接受一項(xiàng)將創(chuàng)新速度略微減慢并且會(huì)減少我3%收入的制度嗎?如果這種新的制度承諾帶來更大的穩(wěn)定性的話，我當(dāng)然會(huì)接受?！?/p>

　　對(duì)一些人來說，更嚴(yán)謹(jǐn)?shù)谋O(jiān)管制度甚至可以帶來黑暗中的一絲曙光。在更加苛刻的貸款條件下，銀行再都不能為了迎合企業(yè)的非監(jiān)管部分而降低自己的借款標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。銀行界的幸存者們還可以從更加高的準(zhǔn)入門檻中獲益。

　　從整體來看，華爾街經(jīng)歷了奧巴馬班組的言行不一。一位銀行說客稱：“財(cái)政部正在逐漸的學(xué)習(xí)如何一方面做一些自己力不能及的事情以表示他們能夠理解政府的憤怒，另一方面維持一個(gè)生機(jī)勃勃的財(cái)政部門”.另外一項(xiàng)針對(duì)其頂住權(quán)利機(jī)構(gòu)催促能力的測(cè)試會(huì)在接下來幾周公布，也就是財(cái)政部公布高管薪資制度的時(shí)候。

　　對(duì)監(jiān)管制度改革最頑強(qiáng)的抵制并不是來自華爾街而是來自華盛頓，華盛頓的政府官員，監(jiān)管者和國(guó)會(huì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人們正深陷在地位之爭(zhēng)和意識(shí)形態(tài)斗爭(zhēng)中。監(jiān)管制度方面的咨詢專家Bert Ely稱：“關(guān)于改革的觀點(diǎn)被搞得七零八落，每個(gè)人都在反對(duì)每一個(gè)觀點(diǎn)”。

　　即使是主要的銀行機(jī)構(gòu)間意見也不一致。聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄保險(xiǎn)公司的Sheila Bair和財(cái)政部金融局的John Dugan曾就Bair先生提出的儲(chǔ)蓄保險(xiǎn)改革的想法展開過爭(zhēng)論。同樣，Dugan先生也反對(duì)聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)蓄保險(xiǎn)公司推行的對(duì)衰退的非銀行機(jī)構(gòu)進(jìn)行清算的單一職權(quán)主張，這一主張?jiān)?jīng)運(yùn)用在銀行機(jī)構(gòu)身上。

　　更糟的是，各方還沒有就系統(tǒng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)監(jiān)管達(dá)成一致意見，而這項(xiàng)監(jiān)管可以識(shí)別并作用于還處在萌芽狀態(tài)的會(huì)對(duì)宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)生重大影響的危險(xiǎn)。管理者希望聯(lián)儲(chǔ)能扮演這一角色，但是國(guó)會(huì)的很多人士反對(duì)這樣的提議。一位具有影響力的參議員Dick Shelby曾經(jīng)指控蓋特納借危機(jī)之際給予了聯(lián)儲(chǔ)過多令人無法接受的權(quán)利。同時(shí)，Bair先生建議由一家綜合機(jī)構(gòu)理事會(huì)來執(zhí)行(或者至少是監(jiān)督)系統(tǒng)監(jiān)管，盡管包括許多人Dugan在內(nèi)的許多人擔(dān)心這樣的監(jiān)管委員會(huì)會(huì)引發(fā)無作為，但是Bair先生的建議還是很具有吸引力。

　　針對(duì)現(xiàn)有監(jiān)管的革新而展開的更大的一場(chǎng)爭(zhēng)論正在醞釀中。各機(jī)構(gòu)之間陳舊的相互重疊的鏈接需要通過將重心重新轉(zhuǎn)移到公司行為上而非其法律形式來進(jìn)行革新，這一點(diǎn)毋庸置疑。據(jù)稱，白宮正在考慮將四家銀行監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)合并成一家，盡管這一想法變數(shù)還很大。

　　針對(duì)諸如貸款，信用卡和共同基金這樣的消費(fèi)者產(chǎn)品成立一個(gè)超級(jí)監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的計(jì)劃還處在萌芽狀態(tài)就已經(jīng)遭到了強(qiáng)烈的抵制。在這輪洗牌中會(huì)慘遭重創(chuàng)的美國(guó)證券交易委員會(huì)同美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)尤其是負(fù)責(zé)對(duì)其進(jìn)行監(jiān)管的參議員銀行委員會(huì)之間有著深刻的友誼，而任何一項(xiàng)革新都是需要國(guó)會(huì)點(diǎn)頭的。公共撫恤基金也加入到了削減SEC 權(quán)利的游說中。

　　此外，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)上合理的東西在政治層面上可能并不具有執(zhí)行力。盡管將SEC和商品期貨交易委員會(huì)合并在監(jiān)管衍生品上確實(shí)有意義，但是在國(guó)會(huì)權(quán)勢(shì)巨大的農(nóng)業(yè)特別委員會(huì)可能會(huì)阻礙這樣的變革。

　　在其他一些幾首的問題上，爭(zhēng)論才剛剛開始，例如：針對(duì)那些規(guī)模太大從而表現(xiàn)不好的銀行，該執(zhí)行什么樣的制約或是是否要拆分一些銀行。國(guó)會(huì)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)們甚至在是否要逐一的通過新制度還是將所有的制度都揉成一個(gè)巨無霸的法案上都無法達(dá)成共識(shí)。

　　所有這些都能用來解釋為什么權(quán)威人士預(yù)計(jì)09年可以通過的新的金融監(jiān)管制度(如果有的話)是鳳毛麟角。金融監(jiān)管改革的姍姍來遲會(huì)正中金融業(yè)下懷，同時(shí)會(huì)達(dá)到像當(dāng)年的薩班斯?奧克斯利法案一樣轟動(dòng)一時(shí)的效果，薩班斯?奧克斯利法案是在安然公司丑聞后倉(cāng)促制定的。但是，如果一項(xiàng)本可以提高穩(wěn)定性的措施淪為政治受害者的話，所有人的處境都會(huì)變得更糟糕。

　　為幫助廣大考生更好地準(zhǔn)備雅思、托福、SAT等考試，澳際留學(xué)特推出【英語(yǔ)學(xué)習(xí)】頻道，涵蓋基礎(chǔ)英語(yǔ)、實(shí)用英語(yǔ)、娛樂英語(yǔ)等多項(xiàng)內(nèi)容，在您通往成功的道路上做您最堅(jiān)實(shí)的左膀右臂。

　　以下部分為【雙語(yǔ)閱讀】?jī)?nèi)容，本文介紹大張旗鼓的金融監(jiān)管改革，中文翻譯部分見第二頁(yè)。

　　Overhauling financial regulation

　　The regulatory rumble begins

　　From The Economist print edition

　　In America and Europe, new rules are already running into stiff resistance—mostly from regulators themselves

　　“YOU want to move at the point where people still have the memory of the trauma,” Tim Geithner explained recently when asked about financial regulation. Aware that the crisis is moving into a new phase, with the emphasis shifting from firighting to working out how supervision should be restructured, America’s treasury secretary wants to seize the moment. He plans to unveil a comprehensive regulatory overhaul by mid-June. Barack Obama has said he wants to sign the changes into law by the year’s end.

　　In Europe, too, the pressure is on. “There’s no room for more delays,” José Manuel Barroso, president of the European Commission, said on May 27th when he unveiled a blueprint for rorm of financial supervision. He announced plans to form two new grandly named institutions: a European Systemic Risk Council, which is supposed to provide early warning of possible risks, and a European System of Financial Supervisors, which would be a super-committee of regulators from across the European Union.

　　The goals of the two new institutions are admirable. Both are intended to correct a fundamental flaw in European bank regulation and supervision; namely, that although banks are free to operate across borders, they are supervised only by their home countries. Slack oversight by one country can, as the crisis has revealed, spread chaos across many. Yet it is not at all clear that the proposals have been thought through properly. “The European Commission is confusing speed with haste,” says Nicolas Véron of Bruegel, a think-tank in Brussels. “The governance, mandate and funding of these new authorities is not really addressed.” Britain, which has the biggest banking centre, is particularly concerned about the proposed rules, which may cede aspects of the City of London’s banking supervision to Brussels.

　　In America, meanwhile, the plans taking shape face resistance, partly from the bankers they will shackle but even more from regulators and lawmakers. Bankers accept they will be forced to build up bigger capital buffers, which will crimp profitability, and that the liquidity of their balance-sheets will be policed more intensively. The regulatory net will be cast over the “shadow” banking network of hedge funds, money-market funds and the like, to which much financial activity gravitated during the boom.

　　Big banks, however, still have enough lobbying power to ensure that not every decision goes against them. True, they are still licking their wounds after the recent passage of draconian credit-card rorms. But they are happier with the government’s proposals on derivatives, under which dealers will be able to continue peddling customised swap contracts away from exchanges, albeit with a higher capital charge.

　　As the crisis has deepened, American bankers have tempered their opposition to the idea of new rules that reduce the chances of another blow-up. “Would I accept regulation that slows innovation a bit and knocks three percentage points off my returns if it promised greater stability? Absolutely,” says the head of one large bank.

　　For some, more stringent regulation even has a silver lining. With tougher mortgage rules, banks will no longer have to lower their standards to compete with the industry’s unregulated parts. The survivors could also benit from higher barriers to entry.

　　On the whole, Wall Street sees a welcome disconnect between the Obama administration’s rhetoric and its actions. The Treasury is “gradually learning” how to square the circle of showing that it understands the public’s anger on the one hand, and maintaining a dynamic financial sector on the other, says one bank lobbyist. Another test of its capacity to resist pitchfork-wielding urges will come in the next few weeks, when it is expected to issue guidelines on executive pay.

　　The stiffest resistance to change is coming not from Wall Street but from Washington, DC, where government officials, regulators and congressional leaders are locked in turf wars and ideological battles. “Opinion has splintered. Everyone is fighting everyone,” says Bert Ely, a consultant on regulatory issues.

　　Even the main banking agencies are at odds with each other. Sheila Bair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and John Dugan, the Comptroller of the Currency, have fallen out over Ms Bair’s deposit-insurance rorms. Mr Dugan also opposes the FDIC’s push for sole authority to liquidate failing non-banks, as it already does with banks.

　　Worse, there is no consensus on the proposed systemic-risk regulator, which would identify and act on emerging “macro-prudential” dangers. The administration wants the Fed to assume the role, but many in Congress oppose this. Dick Shelby, an influential senator, has accused Mr Geithner of using the crisis to hand the Fed unacceptable levels of power. Meanwhile, Ms Bair has suggested that systemic regulation be done (or at least overseen) by a multi-agency council, an idea that is gaining traction even if others (including, again, Mr Dugan) worry that such supervision-by-committee is a recipe for inaction.

　　An even bigger battle is brewing over the shake-up of existing regulators. No one doubts that the archaic, overlapping patchwork of agencies needs modernising, with regulation rocused on a firm’s activities rather than its legal form. Reportedly, the White House is considering rolling the four banking-supervision agencies into one, though the idea is still in flux.

　　But an embryonic plan to create a super-regulator for consumer products, such as mortgages, credit cards and mutual funds, is already encountering stiff opposition. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which would lose out in such a shuffle, has powerful friends on Capitol Hill, especially on the Senate banking committee that oversees the agency—and any overhaul would require congressional approval. Public pension funds have also joined together to lobby against a reduction in the SEC’s power.

　　Moreover, the economically rational may not be politically feasible. Though it would make sense to merge the SEC with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which regulates derivatives, Congress’s powerful agriculture committee would probably block the move.

　　Debate about other thorny issues, such as what restrictions to place on, or whether to dismantle, banks that are too big to fail has barely begun. Congressional leaders cannot even agree on whether to pass new rules in pieces or roll them up into one mega-bill.

　　All of which explains why pundits now expect to see few, if any, further financial rorms passed in 2009. Delay could play into the financial industry’s hands, to the extent that it reduces the likelihood of heat-of-the-moment laws like Sarbanes-Oxley, rushed through after the Enron scandal. But if measures that would increase stability fall victim to politics, everyone will be worse off.

上12下

共2頁(yè)