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在APEC經(jīng)濟(jì)會議上我們都看到了,中國和日本人的一次會面,那么中國與日本:妥協(xié)還是對峙呢?請看下面的雙語新聞。
When Xi Jinping visited Japan in 2009 as Chinese vice-president, he asked on short notice to meet Japanese Emperor Akihito. In a rare move rlecting his importance as the future Chinese leader and a desire to capitalise on warming ties, Tokyo broke protocol and granted an audience, despite an imperial household rule requiring requests to be made one month in advance.2009年,當(dāng)習(xí)近平作為中國國家副主席訪問日本時,幾乎在最后一刻,他才提出會晤日本明仁天皇(Emperor Akihito)的請求。盡管根據(jù)日本宮內(nèi)廳(Imperial Household Agency)的規(guī)定,此類會晤請求應(yīng)提前一個月作出,日本政府還是打破慣例批準(zhǔn)了這一會晤。這一罕見舉動一方面反映了習(xí)近平作為中國未來領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的重要性,另一方面則表明日本政府希望從中日關(guān)系的好轉(zhuǎn)中獲益。
Five years on, relations between the two countries are so poor that Japanese diplomats are still desperately trying to secure a first meeting between Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Mr Xi when Beijing hosts the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit next week. With strong, nationalistic leaders running both countries, the Asian powers are at loggerheads over many issues – most dangerously over the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.五年過去了,中日關(guān)系又降至冰點。日本外交官仍然在絕望地爭取在下周的北京主辦亞太經(jīng)合組織(APEC)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人峰會期間,讓日本首相安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)和習(xí)近平舉行首次會晤。在兩位強勢的民族主義色彩領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下,中日兩個亞洲強國在許多問題上爭論不休。其中最危險的是圍繞東中國海上有爭議的尖閣諸島(Senkaku Islands,中國稱釣魚島及其附屬島嶼)的爭端。
Signs are emerging that a meeting might happen, including a recent toning down of anti-Japan rhetoric in China. Some experts say Mr Xi does not want to tarnish Apec – the marquee international event in China this year – by rusing to meet Mr Abe.Pessimists warn the meeting might add up to little more than a courtesy handshake.不過有跡象表明,雙方有可能會舉行會晤。比如,中國的反日言論近期有所緩和。部分專家表示,習(xí)近平不想因為拒絕會晤安倍晉三而令今年的APEC峰會蒙上陰影,畢竟這是中國今年舉辦的一次國際盛事。而持悲觀態(tài)度的人士則警告說,雙方的會晤可能不會比禮節(jié)性的握手多多少內(nèi)容。
But others hope the leaders can look beyond their deep-seated divisions after two tense years in whichJapan has boosted military spending and enhanced alliances with India and Australia to counter the rise of China.不過,其他人則希望,在經(jīng)歷了兩年的緊張關(guān)系之后,兩國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的眼光能夠超越雙方的深層次分歧。在這兩年中,日本加大了軍事開支,并加強了與印度和澳大利亞的同盟關(guān)系,以對抗中國的崛起。
“The Chinese are making a strategic mistake by isolating themselves,” says Kunihiko Miyake, a former Japanese diplomat who knows Mr Abe well. “We are transforming. We are more inclined to collective and multilateral alliance networks than bore. We believe the US-Japan alliance is not enough.”熟悉安倍晉三的前外交官宮家邦彥(Kunihiko Miyake)表示:“中國人正在犯下孤立自己的戰(zhàn)略錯誤。而我們卻在改變。我們比過去更傾向于建立集體的、多邊的同盟網(wǎng)絡(luò)。我們相信,僅僅發(fā)展日美同盟是不夠的?!?/p>
China has been engaged in a campaign to paint Mr Abe as a revisionist who wants to deny Japan’s military past. Meanwhile, Mr Abe has been visiting countries in southeast Asia and offering help as they tackle their own maritime disputes with China. The US worries about the potential for conflict that could drag it into dispute with China.中國一直在開展宣傳攻勢,將安倍晉三描繪為想要否認(rèn)日本軍國主義歷史的修正主義者。與此同時,安倍晉三卻一直在訪問東南亞國家,在它們應(yīng)對自身與中國的海上爭端之際,為它們提供幫助。至于美國,擔(dān)心的則是中日發(fā)生沖突的可能性,因為這可能會令美國卷入與中國的爭端。
Yoichi Funabashi, former editor-in-chi of Japan’s Asahi newspaper, says Asia is witnessing a “tectonic shift” similar in nature to when Japan deated China in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95. That victory, and another over Russia 10 years later, set Japan on course for a century of dominance in Asia. But China, powered by three decades of unparalleled growth, is regaining its footing and returning to the position that it traditionally held in the region.曾任日本《朝日新聞》(Asahi)主編的船橋洋一(Yoichi Funabashi)表示,亞洲正在經(jīng)歷一場“板塊運動”。在性質(zhì)上,它與1894年到1895年期間日本在中日戰(zhàn)爭中打敗中國時發(fā)生的巨變類似。那次戰(zhàn)爭的勝利以及10年后日本在日俄戰(zhàn)爭中的勝利,將日本送入了主導(dǎo)亞洲的世紀(jì)。然而,中國在經(jīng)歷30年無與倫比的飛速增長之后,正再一次站穩(wěn)腳跟,并重返在亞洲的傳統(tǒng)地位。
“It is so difficult for Japan to adjust to this new power shift, psychologically and politically,” says Mr Funabashi. “Japan has never believed in ‘Japan as number one’, but it has believed in ‘Japan as number one in Asia’?.?.?.?this is a crude awakening for Japan.”船橋洋一表示:“無論是心理上還是政治上,日本都很難適應(yīng)這一新的力量轉(zhuǎn)移。日本從未相信‘日本全球第一’,卻一直相信‘日本亞洲第一’……對日本來說,現(xiàn)在是一種痛苦的覺醒過程?!?/p>
For roughly two years, communication between the governments has been minimal, preventing the countries from tackling a host of important issues from security to trade. Anti-Japan protests in China in 2012 sparked a big decline in Japanese foreign investment in China which has fallen 33 per cent this year.在過去兩年里,中日兩國政府間的對話一直處于極低水平。這種狀況令兩國無法應(yīng)對從安全到貿(mào)易的一系列重要問題。2012年,中國的反日抗議活動導(dǎo)致日本對華投資大幅減少。今年,日本對華投資減少了33%。
Yukio Okamoto, a foreign policy expert who advised Junichiro Koizumi, the former Japanese prime minister who enraged China by frequently visiting the controversial Yasukuni shrine, says Sino-Japanese ties are “the worst since normalisation in 1972”.曾任日本前首相小泉純一郎(Junichiro Koizumi)輔佐官的岡本行夫(Yukio Okamoto)表示,日中關(guān)系正處于“1972年邦交正?;詠淼淖畹忘c”。當(dāng)初,小泉純一郎就曾因為頻繁參拜有爭議的靖國神社(Yasukuni Shrine)而激怒中國。
Xi Jinping: Domestic pressures mean he has little leeway to change stance習(xí)近平:國內(nèi)壓力使他幾無轉(zhuǎn)變立場的余地
In a speech in September marking the 69th anniversary of the end of the second world war, Chinese President Xi Jinpingrailed against “militarist” Japanese people who denied wartime atrocities and “beautified invasion and colonialism”,writes Jamil Anderlini in Beijing .今年9月,在紀(jì)念“二戰(zhàn)”結(jié)束69周年的講話中,中國國家主席習(xí)近平嚴(yán)厲譴責(zé)了日本國內(nèi)具有“軍國主義”思想的人士,稱他們否認(rèn)戰(zhàn)時罪行,“美化侵略戰(zhàn)爭與殖民統(tǒng)治”。
“Chinese people have hearts that are bigger than the oceans or the sky but we dinitely cannot tolerate sand in our eyes,” Mr Xi said.“中國人民有比海洋天空更為寬廣的胸懷,但我們的眼睛里也決容不下沙子,”習(xí)近平說。
A couple of weeks later, just in case anyone had missed the message, the president exhorted the Chinese military to prepare itself to “fight and win a regional war”.幾周之后,就好像是為了防止有人沒聽明白這句話,習(xí)近平告誡中國軍隊做好“打贏一場地區(qū)性戰(zhàn)爭”的準(zhǔn)備。
Since he took over as paramount leader in late 2012, Mr Xi has made unabashed nationalism and animosity toward Japan central tenets of his foreign policy. While former Chinese premier Wen Jiabao posed for pictures playing baseball with his Japanese counterpart, Mr Xi has tried his best to never be seen in the same room as Mr Abe.自2012年末成為中國最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人以來,習(xí)近平不加掩飾的民族主義傾向和對日本的敵意,主導(dǎo)了他外交政策。中國前總理溫家寶曾與日本首相一起打棒球并留影,而習(xí)近平總是盡量避免與安倍晉三同時出現(xiàn)在一個房間里。
Chinese leaders govern partly through slogans and the president explicitly dines his “China Dream” theory as the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”, meant to erase the humiliation inflicted by former imperialist invaders like Japan.中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人常常利用口號作為執(zhí)政工具,習(xí)近平明確地把其“中國夢”理論定義為“中華民族的偉大復(fù)興”——意思是洗雪日本等前帝國主義侵略者給中國帶來的恥辱。
“Under Xi’s leadership China has become much tougher in the way it deals with Japan, particularly when it comes to maritime [territorial] disputes,” says Feng Wei, a history professor at Fudan University in Shanghai.中日兩國2014年軍事預(yù)算(數(shù)據(jù):IMF)“在習(xí)近平的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下,中國在與日本打交道時比以前強硬得多,在涉及到海上(領(lǐng)土)糾紛時尤為如此,”復(fù)旦大學(xué)歷史系教授馮瑋說。
At first glance, this hostility appears to be personal. Mr Xi is a “princeling” whose father was a prominent Communist commander in the “Chinese people’s war of resistance against Japanese aggression” (as the second world war is known in China). He grew up surrounded by the battle-hardened Communist elite and their children who were indoctrinated with a hatred of the “dwarf pirate” invaders who conquered most of China in the 1930s and 1940s.乍一看,這種敵意似乎有個人原因。習(xí)近平是“太子黨”的一員。他父親是“中國人民反抗日本侵略的戰(zhàn)爭”(“二戰(zhàn)”在中國的說法)中的一名杰出的中共指揮官。在習(xí)近平的成長過程中,周圍盡是些身經(jīng)百戰(zhàn)的中共精英及其子女,這些干部子弟被灌輸了對“倭寇”侵略者的仇恨。上世紀(jì)三、四十年代,日本侵略者曾占領(lǐng)中國的大部分國土。
Chinese policy makers and diplomats complain that Mr Xi rarely consults other leaders or party elders on foreign affairs, including the stance on Japan.中國政策制定者和外交官抱怨稱,習(xí)近平在包括對日立場等外交事務(wù)上,很少與其他領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人或黨內(nèi)元老商量。
But the evidence on his personal attitudes is contradictory. Bore he was elevated to the top job, he was renowned in Japanese diplomatic circles for his deep understanding of Japan. He has visited the country on at least four official trips, most recently in 2009.但有關(guān)反日是他個人態(tài)度的證據(jù),又有些前后矛盾。在當(dāng)上中國最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人之前,習(xí)近平在日本外交官圈子中以對日本有深刻理解而聞名。他對日本進(jìn)行了至少4次官方訪問,最近一次是在2009年。
“Initially many Japanese officials and diplomats were very pleased that Xi was going to be top leader – many of them had a very good experience working with him,” says one Japanese diplomat. “Many believe Xi’s current antagonism to Japan is a nationalistic performance for a domestic Chinese audience.”“聽說習(xí)近平將成為中國最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人之后,一開始許多日本官員和外交官都非常高興,他們中許多人都有過跟習(xí)近平合作的愉快經(jīng)歷,”一名日本外交官說?!霸S多人認(rèn)為,習(xí)近平目前對日本的敵意是給中國國內(nèi)民眾看的一場民族主義表演?!?/p>
The president began his tenure in the midst of huge government-sanctioned anti-Japanese protests over the territorial dispute in the East China Sea.習(xí)近平上任之時,由于東中國海(East China Sea)領(lǐng)土糾紛,中國國內(nèi)爆發(fā)了聲勢浩大的反日示威活動,這些活動得到了政府認(rèn)可。
Chinese political analysts say he has used the issue as a political tool to consolidate his own power. In the last two years, China has unveiled dozens of war memorials, announced new holidays to mark important anti-Japanese battles and flooded cinemas and television with violent anti-Japanese war dramas.中國政治分析人士表示,習(xí)近平把日本問題當(dāng)作了鞏固自身權(quán)力的一個政治工具。過去兩年里,中國建成了許多戰(zhàn)爭紀(jì)念碑,宣布了紀(jì)念抗戰(zhàn)重要戰(zhàn)役的新節(jié)日,并上映了大量充滿暴力的抗日戰(zhàn)爭題材影視作品。
More dangerous moves include sending regular naval and paramilitary patrols to contested waters around uninhabited islands in the East China Sea and unilaterally declaring an air dence zone in the same area.更危險的動作包括,定期向東中國海一些無人居住島嶼周圍的爭議海域派出海軍和準(zhǔn)軍事巡邏隊,以及單方面宣布在該地區(qū)設(shè)立防空識別區(qū)。
Mr Xi has laid out a far more assertive foreign policy that some analysts have interpreted as an attempt to exclude the US from East Asia and relegate Tokyo to minor power status.習(xí)近平已清晰地展現(xiàn)出一種比以往強硬得多的外交政策。有些分析人士對此的解讀是,中國正力爭把美國勢力從東亞排擠出去,并讓日本變成一個次要大國。
“China hasn’t thought out a concrete policy of forcing other countries to submit to it but the leadership certainly feels China should be recognised as number one in Asia,” says Shi Yinhong, director of the Center for American Studies at Renmin University. “In practical terms that means China has to show it is more powerful than Japan and it also needs Washington to recognise its supremacy in the region.”“中國還沒想出迫使其他國家服從自己的具體政策,但領(lǐng)導(dǎo)層肯定覺得,中國應(yīng)當(dāng)是公認(rèn)的亞洲頭號國家,”中國人民大學(xué)美國研究中心主任時殷弘說,“在實踐層面,這意味著中國不得不對外顯示,中國比日本更強大,中國也需要美國承認(rèn)其在亞洲的支配地位?!?/p>
While Mr Xi’s administration has stoked anti-Japanese sentiment as a way to build nationalism there is also an element of appeasement.盡管習(xí)近平政府已推高了國內(nèi)反日情緒以弘揚民族主義,但其中也有安撫國內(nèi)民眾的用意。
In the wake of the 1989 Tiananmen massacre China introduced a“patriotic education” curriculum that emphasised the “100 years of humiliation” suffered at the hands of foreign invaders, particularly focused on Japan.1989年天安門大屠殺之后,中國學(xué)校里引入“愛國主義教育”課程,著重描述中國被外來的、尤其是日本侵略者蹂躪的“屈辱的100年”。
Today, as most countries in the region nervously eye growing Chinese assertiveness and strident territorial claims, domestic propaganda portrays Beijing as responding in solidarity with the rest of Asia to a Japan that is reviving its militarist past. As a result, particularly among younger Chinese, voicing pro-Japanese sentiment is often perceived in the same way virulently racist or anti-Semitic views would be viewed in western countries. In this context, even Japanese officials acknowledge Mr Xi has very little leeway to improve ties.正當(dāng)亞洲多數(shù)國家緊張地看著中國變得日益自信、在領(lǐng)土上日益強硬時,中國國內(nèi)的宣傳口徑則是,中國與亞洲其他國家團(tuán)結(jié)一致,正在應(yīng)對軍國主義思想死灰復(fù)燃的日本。結(jié)果是,一旦有人發(fā)表親日言論,往往會遭到惡毒攻擊——尤其是在中國年輕人當(dāng)中——就如在西方國家發(fā)表種族主義或反猶太言論一樣。在此背景下,就連日本官員都承認(rèn),習(xí)近平基本上沒有改善兩國關(guān)系的空間。
“His administration is quite stable and he has set himself up as a kind of emperor but he can’t just do whatever he likes and there are some areas where he has no room for manoeuvre,” says the Japanese diplomat. “Japan is one of those areas – if he was soft on Japan it could destabilise his administration.”“習(xí)近平領(lǐng)導(dǎo)的政府相當(dāng)穩(wěn)定,他已把自己塑造成一位帝王般的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人,但他也不能隨心所欲,他在某些領(lǐng)域也沒有回旋余地,”前述日本外交官說,“日本問題就是這樣的領(lǐng)域之一——如果他對日本軟弱,就很可能削弱其政府的穩(wěn)定性?!?/p>
Shinzo Abe: Inflexibility on key issues threatens fort to boost relations安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe):在關(guān)鍵問題上的固執(zhí)恐危及他改善關(guān)系的努力
Shinzo Abe, Japan’s prime minister, sent his national security adviser to China on Thursday as Tokyo’s forts to reset relations between the two most important nations in Asia gathered pace, writes Demetri Sevastopulo in Tokyo .日本首相安倍晉三周四派出其國家安全顧問訪華,加大了改善亞洲最重要的兩國間關(guān)系的努力。
Dispatching Shotaro Yachi, a veteran diplomat who helped engineer Mr Abe’s landmark trip to China as prime ministerin 2006, is part of an fort to secure a meeting with President Xi Jinping at the Apec summit.派出谷內(nèi)正太郎(Shotaro Yachi),是安倍確保自己能在亞太經(jīng)合組織(APEC)會議期間與中國國家主席習(xí)近平會晤的舉措之一。谷內(nèi)是一位資深外交官,曾在2006年促成了具有里程碑意義的安倍以首相身份訪華之旅。
Experts say even a public handshake would thaw relations, and send a message to officials on both sides that they can resume discussions about crucial issues from diplomacy to trade.專家們表示,哪怕兩國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人只是公開握個手,也能使兩國關(guān)系解凍,并向雙方官員傳達(dá)一個訊息:他們可以著手重啟從外交關(guān)系到貿(mào)易等各種關(guān)鍵問題的討論。
Some in Japan argue there is no time to lose. “It is very important for Xi Jinping and Mr Abe to meet because of the vector pointing towards deterioration next year,” says Yukio Okamoto, a former Japanese diplomat. “China is looking to mount a campaign focusing on?.?.?.?the 70th anniversary of the victory over Japanese imperialism.”一些日本人士認(rèn)為,改善兩國關(guān)系已迫在眉睫?!傲?xí)近平和安倍的會晤非常重要,因為兩國關(guān)系明年還將惡化,”日本前外交官岡本行夫(Yukio Okamoto)表示,“明年,中國很可能將圍繞戰(zhàn)勝日本帝國主義70周年發(fā)起一場運動?!?/p>
When Mr Abe began his second stint as prime minister in 2012, experts were worried about a possible confrontation between the Asian powers over the disputed Senkaku Islands – which China calls the Diaoyu. Months earlier, violent anti-Japan protests had broken out in China over Tokyo’s decision to buy some of the islands from their private owner. The dispute lt diplomatic relations in cold storage and ruled out any meeting with the Chinese leader.當(dāng)安倍在2012年開始第二個任期時,專家曾擔(dān)心,中日間可能因為有領(lǐng)土爭議的尖閣諸島發(fā)生沖突。在那之前數(shù)月,由于日本政府決定從尖閣諸島的私人所有者那里購買其中一些小島,中國國內(nèi)爆發(fā)了暴力反日抗議。這場爭端令兩國外交關(guān)系跌至冰點,也斷絕了中日領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人會晤的一切可能性。
The mood could not have been more different from 2006 when Mr Abe as a newly minted nationalist prime minister impressed his critics by making big forts to mend ties with China. People close to him say he would have liked to pick up relations with Beijing where he had lt off, but that China’s behaviour over the Senkaku made that impossible.當(dāng)時的氣氛與2006年時迥然不同。2006年,民族主義傾向的安倍首次出任首相,他做出了巨大的努力來修補與中國之間的關(guān)系,給批評他的人留下了深刻印象。與安倍親近的人表示,安倍本想在最新任內(nèi)重拾與北京的關(guān)系,但中方在尖閣諸島問題上的反應(yīng)使他不可能這樣做。
Japan had dended the purchase of the islands, saying it was to prevent Shintaro Ishihara, the rightwing, anti-China Tokyo governor, from changing the status quo by buying them and erecting buildings. But Beijing lambasted Japan and started sending ships to the Senkaku, where they increasingly began to enter Japanese territorial waters.日方堅稱,東京方面購買島嶼,是為了防止右翼的東京都知事石原慎太郎(Shintaro Ishihara)出手購島并在島上修建建筑從而改變島嶼現(xiàn)狀。但北京方面激烈抨擊日方,并開始向尖閣諸島派遣船只,這些船只開始越來越多地進(jìn)入日本領(lǐng)海。
In a thinly veiled speech to Asian and US dence officials in Singapore in May, Mr Abe criticised China by saying that countries should “not use force or coercion” to press their territorial claims. He also hinted to southeast Asian nations that Japan would help face down bullies.5月,安倍在新加坡面對亞洲和美國的防務(wù)官員,發(fā)表了一篇幾乎不加掩飾的講話,對中國作出批評。他說,國家“不應(yīng)使用武力或者脅迫方式”來推行自己的領(lǐng)土主張。他還對東南亞國家暗示,日本可以幫它們抵御大國欺凌。
Officials in Beijing, however, saw Mr Abe as a revisionist leader who had enraged China in December 2013 by visiting the Yasukuni shrine, a memorial to Japan’s 2.4m war dead that remains controversial because it includes the “souls” of 14 convicted Class A war criminals.然而,在北京官員的眼中,安倍偏離了日本傳統(tǒng)外交路線。安倍在2013年12月參拜靖國神社(Yasukuni shrine),激怒了中國。靖國神社中供奉著日本240萬名戰(zhàn)爭死難者,其中包括14名甲級戰(zhàn)犯的“亡靈”,一直備受爭議。
In 2006 Mr Abe maintained a policy of “strategic ambiguity” that allowed China and Japan to paper over differences – particularly over Yasukuni – by not rerring to them.在2006年時,安倍采用了一種“含混戰(zhàn)術(shù)”,通過閉口不談兩國間爭議,尤其是靖國神社,來掩飾兩國分歧。
In the months bore his December 2013 shrine visit, relations with China had begun to thaw and Chinese officials once again opened talks with Japanese counterparts. But Mr Abe’s Yasukuni trip slammed the door on any rapprochement. The Obama administration, which mainly welcomes the presence of a strong Japanese leader, was livid because it felt Mr Abe was jeopardising forts to ensure that the US and Japan – helped by South Korea – could counter China. Abe confidants say he felt he had sacrificed his desire to visit Yasukuni as leader in 2006, and that he was unwilling to do so again because China itself was raising tensions in the Senkaku.在他2013年底參拜靖國神社前,中日關(guān)系其實已經(jīng)開始解凍,兩國官員又一次開始對話。但安倍的參拜徹底關(guān)上了和解的大門。通常樂見強勢的日本領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的奧巴馬(Obama)政府對此非常惱火,認(rèn)為安倍破壞了日美(在韓國幫助下)對抗中國的努力。與安倍關(guān)系密切的人士透露,安倍認(rèn)為,自己在2006年時犧牲了作為領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人參拜靖國神社的渴望,而如今中國在尖閣諸島挑起緊張局勢,他不愿再犧牲一次。
His visit was celebrated by Japanese nationalists, but critics felt he should once againhave set aside his own desire for the sake of Japan’s national interest. Mr Okamoto says that while Yasukuni is not a war shrine, Mr Abe should have foregone the visit for “tactical reasons”.安倍的參拜受到了日本民族主義者的熱捧,但批評者認(rèn)為,安倍應(yīng)該再一次為了日本的國家利益把個人愿望放在一邊。岡本行夫表示,盡管靖國神社不是一個戰(zhàn)爭神社,安倍也應(yīng)該為了“戰(zhàn)術(shù)上的原因”放棄參拜。
Yoichi Funabashi, former editor of the Asahi newspaper, says the decision was “mind-boggling”, since Mr Abe had been applauded for mending ties with China back in 2006, and because he already has “impeccable credentials with the conservatives”.《朝日新聞》前主編船橋洋一表示,安倍的決定“難以理解”,因為他在2006年修復(fù)中日關(guān)系的努力受到了贊譽,而且他已經(jīng)“在保守主義人士中樹立了完美形象”。
But Yasukuni was not the only incident to sour relations. Earlier in 2013, Mr Abe had posed in the cockpit of a fighter jet with the number “731” painted on it. China thought it was a move to rub salt in war wounds, as the number was the name of an infamous Japanese army group that performed biological and chemical experiments on Chinese people. Japanese experts say it was just a bungled photo opportunity, but it raised the spectre of Mr Abe’s sympathy for historical revisionists.中日兩國間外商直接投資(數(shù)據(jù):Heaver Analytics)不過,參拜靖國神社并不是讓中日關(guān)系惡化的唯一事件。2013年早些時候,安倍曾在一架標(biāo)有數(shù)字“731”的戰(zhàn)斗機駕駛艙中擺拍照片。中國認(rèn)為,這是一種在傷口上撒鹽的舉動,因為“731”曾是日本一支臭名昭著的軍團(tuán)的番號,這支部隊曾在中國人身上做生化試驗。日方專家稱,這只是拍照時機選取地過于糟糕,但這一事件仍然讓外界擔(dān)心,安倍對歷史修正主義者充滿同情。
China has attached two conditions to any meeting between the leaders – that Japan concede there is a dispute over the Senkaku and that Mr Abe assure Beijing he will not visit Yasukuni this year – but Tokyo has hinted that they go too far.中方為雙方領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人間的會晤開出了兩個條件:日本必須承認(rèn)在尖閣諸島問題上存在爭議;安倍必須向中國政府保證今年不會參拜靖國神社。不過,日本政府曾暗示,這些條件超出了日本政府的承受能力。
Yasuhiro Matsuda, a China expert at Tokyo University, says both sides need to find a solution by returning to the agreements of the past, since it will be very hard to reach a new agreement in the current climate.東京大學(xué)(Tokyo University)中國專家松田康博(Yasuhiro Matsuda)表示,兩國在當(dāng)前氣氛下達(dá)成新的協(xié)議非常困難,因此,雙方應(yīng)當(dāng)回到過去的協(xié)議,從中尋找方案。
A person familiar with Mr Abe’s thinking says Japan is trying to engineer a situation that allows both sides to maintain their stance on the Senkaku. China has changed the status quo by sending ships to the area, but Japan has rused to accept there is a dispute and so will not negotiate over the island’s future.一名熟悉安倍想法的知情人士表示,日本正試圖構(gòu)建一種局面,讓雙方都維持自身對尖閣諸島的立場。現(xiàn)在,中國向該海域派遣海監(jiān)船,已經(jīng)改變了這一地區(qū)的現(xiàn)狀。然而,日本始終拒絕承認(rèn)該島存在爭議,因此也不會就該島未來開展談判。
“The Chinese can now say our mission is complete and the Japanese can say we have given nothing away,” the person says about such an arrangement. “Both sides can say what they want?.?.?.?which is a curious equilibrium.”對于日本試圖構(gòu)建的那種局面,這位知情人士表示:“如果能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)那種局面,中國人就可以宣稱我們完成了任務(wù),而日本人則可以宣稱我們并未放棄任何東西。雙方都能宣示自己的訴求……這是一種十分奇特的均衡局面?!?/p>
Amy GUO 經(jīng)驗: 17年 案例:4539 擅長:美國,澳洲,亞洲,歐洲
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