互聯(lián)網(wǎng)女皇的報(bào)告正在警示美國(guó)注意中國(guó)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司!.

　　After having been at Kleiner the past two years for “Trends season” as the team calls it, it was amazingly rreshing to read Mary’s Internet Trends report for pure pleasure.

　　在過去兩年中，作為Kleiner公司“Trends Season”團(tuán)隊(duì)的一員，能夠閱讀Mary的“互聯(lián)網(wǎng)趨勢(shì)報(bào)告”讓我神清氣爽。

　　As part of Mary’s team at Kleiner Perkins, I can appreciate the incredibly detailed research, intense thought and 100s of hours of time that goes into creating what has become the industry’s go-to state of the Internet (mobile).On the surface, Mary’s analysis is interesting, but it is her ability to provoke thoughts around future implications of our world that is most powerful.

　　作為Mary在Kleiner Perkins的團(tuán)隊(duì)一員，我能夠欣賞到不可思議的詳細(xì)的研究資料、熱情洋溢的想法，和花大量時(shí)間研究出來的現(xiàn)狀。表面上，Mary的分析僅僅是有趣，實(shí)際上，這引起了我們世界未來影響的強(qiáng)有力的思想方面的沖擊。

　　With a fresh set of eyes and the liberty of not reading footnotes for typos, I had the patience to do what “The Queen of the Net” intends all of her readers to do, critically think about her analysis and let their minds wonder freely. As she tells us all, you must take a step back and “dream the dream.”

　　拋開打印錯(cuò)誤，在一雙明亮的眼睛幫助下，我和其他網(wǎng)絡(luò)女王的讀者一樣，按照她的意思批判的看待她的分析并且自由的思考。正如她告訴我們的那樣，你們必須后退一步，并且擁有一個(gè)夢(mèng)想。

　　While reading Trends, I became fascinated with the slides summarizing the recent US tendency to China’s “playbook” around messaging platforms.

　　在閱讀報(bào)告的同時(shí)，我對(duì)最近美國(guó)關(guān)于中國(guó)關(guān)于信息平臺(tái)的劇本的各方面總結(jié)非常入迷。

　　I began to wonder where else the US internet market might run a Chinese “play,” and what those storylines would imply for global internet brands. I warn, some of the implications are scary and admittedly low probability, but it’s always fun to think about what the future of the global internet could hold. So, let’s play out some of the most interesting scenarios.

　　我開始好奇，還有哪里的美國(guó)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)市場(chǎng)可能會(huì)使用中國(guó)的腳本。并且那些情節(jié)暗示全球國(guó)際名牌。我認(rèn)為，一些含義非?？膳虏⑶铱赡苄院艿?。但是考慮未來全球互聯(lián)網(wǎng)能獲得什么總是非常有趣的。所以，讓我們展開一些最有意思的劇情。

　　Playbook A: Lower Marketplace Take Rate – for the most common Chinese playbooks

　　劇本A：針對(duì)中國(guó)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)市場(chǎng)的模型——北美將出現(xiàn)更低的截留比率

　　Slide 158 shows that China’s e-commerce companies have significantly lower take rates, faster growth rates and larger scale when compared to their US counterparts.

　　資料顯示在和美國(guó)同行相比時(shí)，中國(guó)電商有明顯的截留比率(投資者投入100元，截留1元，即為1% Take Rate)、更快的增長(zhǎng)速度和更大的手筆。

　　The lower Chinese take rate extends beyond e-commerce into mobile marketplaces; Didi/Kuadidi (Uber of China) has a take rate of ~0% vs. Uber & Lyft who have take rates of ~10%.

　　低截留比率方法讓中國(guó)不斷深入并拓展移動(dòng)市場(chǎng)。滴滴打車/快滴打車截留比率為0%，相比較而言美國(guó)的Uber和Lyft截留比率為10%

　　Most marketplace businesses in the U.S. pitch/expect they can reach ~20% take rate over time, including Uber and Lyft.

　　但是大多數(shù)的美國(guó)市場(chǎng)的截留比率會(huì)隨著時(shí)間的過去達(dá)到20%，其中包括Uber和Lyft。

　　Given the intense battle for market-share (competition), limited access to capital (although it doesn’t feel like that today) and proven success in China it is very possible that we see take-rate compression in the US and long-term unit economics that are significantly lower than many companies are predicting.

　　在進(jìn)行了激烈的市場(chǎng)占有率競(jìng)爭(zhēng)后，這種在利潤(rùn)上的受限和在中國(guó)已經(jīng)證明的成功使得我們看到美國(guó)市場(chǎng)截留比率的壓縮或許將成為一種可能，并且我們能夠發(fā)現(xiàn)美國(guó)采用利潤(rùn)壓縮及長(zhǎng)效經(jīng)濟(jì)的模式通常比很多公司預(yù)測(cè)的要少得多。

　　This will have tremendous implications on FCF, which Mary points out is a key to ultimate company valuation (slide 176). The math is simple, if Uber’s take rate is 5% vs. 20% their GMV (what riders pay for a ride), must be 4x as big to have equal net revenue.

　　但這一切也會(huì)對(duì)FCF造成極大的影響，就如同Mary指出的，這是最終公司資產(chǎn)評(píng)估的關(guān)鍵。這道數(shù)學(xué)題很簡(jiǎn)單，如果Uber 的截留比率分別為5%及20%，那么在用戶數(shù)不變的情況下，前者就要比后者擁有4倍的用戶數(shù)。

　　In the extreme case, what if Uber’s take rate was forced to be 0%? Worth noting, this is not outside of the realm of possibility -- western-centric companies OfferUp, Wallapop, VarageSale all have 0% take rate and combine for ~$2B+ of GMV.

　　在極端條件下，如果Uber的截留比率被迫降到了0%，將會(huì)發(fā)生什么?不外乎另一種可能，美國(guó)重要的同類公司OfferUp, Wallapop和 VarageSale都將被逼至0%的截留比率，并且整合出超過20億美元的市場(chǎng)份額。

　　Let’s assume this is true, marketplace take rates trend toward 0%. Could Uber, Postmates, Handy and Zirx still exist? There are certainly other business models that can exist on top of these platforms that could allow them to make profit.

　　如果這些假設(shè)這是真的，市場(chǎng)利潤(rùn)率趨向于0%。Uber, Postmates, Handy 和 Zirx這些公司還能生存嗎?他們當(dāng)然還有其他的商業(yè)模式讓這些平臺(tái)能夠盈利。

　　Uber could show ads (they already are) to their users and have ad supported rides. Other marketplaces (mostly content) have this as their primary business model (e.g. Youtube).

　　Uber能夠?qū)λ麄兊念櫩筒シ艔V告。其他行業(yè)其實(shí)也把這個(gè)作為基礎(chǔ)商業(yè)模式。(例如Youtube)

　　Another option is Uber implements a subscription business model where to use the app you have to pay $100 per month (+ pass on cost of ride to drivers).

　　Uber另一個(gè)可選的方案是，采取會(huì)員商業(yè)模式，對(duì)APP的使用進(jìn)行每月100美元的收費(fèi)。

　　Playbook B: Local Market Consolidation (M&A) – As summarized in Slide 157, China’s Internet has seen accelerating consolidation through M&A, the most notable being the recent merger of Didi/Kuaidi.

　　劇本B：聯(lián)合當(dāng)?shù)厥袌?chǎng)

　　It seems inevitable that US marketplaces will follow suit overtime as the intense competition is leading to lower take rates, higher customer acquisition costs and excessive cash burn.

　　似乎不可避免的是，由于競(jìng)爭(zhēng)的進(jìn)一步激烈，美國(guó)市場(chǎng)也將跟風(fēng)導(dǎo)致更低的平臺(tái)截留比率，更高的用戶獲取成本以及最終過多的資金被消耗。

　　We are already hearing rumors of this M&A playbook being run in the US

　　Playbook A & B are closely related. If competition increases (or remains high), take-rates will fall, resulting in a higher likelihood of M&A (which could then decrease competition and lead to a higher take rate).

　　目前已有風(fēng)傳，收購(gòu)或聯(lián)合當(dāng)?shù)厥袌?chǎng)的政策正在被執(zhí)行。其中，上述的劇本A和劇本B是緊密相關(guān)的。如果競(jìng)爭(zhēng)進(jìn)一步升級(jí)的話，截留比率將會(huì)繼續(xù)下降，并且會(huì)很可能導(dǎo)致市場(chǎng)兼并行為的產(chǎn)生。

　　Playbook C: Large U.S. Companies try to Invest in Emerging Chinese Leaders:

　　劇本C：大型美國(guó)公司將嘗試對(duì)崛起的中國(guó)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)領(lǐng)袖進(jìn)行投資。

　　We are seeing the Chinese mega-internet companies aggressively investing in industry leading private US companies. Alibaba has put $100s of millions into Snapchat & Lyft (and Didi/Kuaidi), and invested in Quixey, Ouya, Peel, Kabam and Jet among others.

　　我們能夠看到中國(guó)大型互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司正在積極向美國(guó)領(lǐng)銜的私企進(jìn)行投資。阿里巴巴已經(jīng)向Snapchat & Lyft公司投資超過1億美元，并且還針對(duì)Quixey, Ouya, Peel, Kabam and Jet進(jìn)行了投資。

　　Tencent has invested $10s of millions into Snapchat and is also an investor in Pocketgems, Whisper, Weebly, Scanadu, Riot Games etc.

　　騰訊已經(jīng)給Snapchat公司投資幾千萬美元，并且它還是Pocketgems, Whisper, Weebly, Scanadu和 Riot Games等公司的投資商。

　　Baidu invested in Uber’s Series E. Could we see mega-internet companies in the US follow suit?

　　百度投資Uber的E系列項(xiàng)目。那么未來或許我們能夠看到美國(guó)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司也這么做嗎?

　　Potential Chinese Playbook D: Cross Border Acquisitions (US tries to Follow):

　　可能的中國(guó)劇本D：跨界融合

　　The interesting part about playbook C is that the next logical step for Chinese companies is to start aggressively making acquisitions of US based internet brands.

　　劇本C的有意思的部分是中國(guó)公司邏輯上的下一步---開始強(qiáng)力收購(gòu)美國(guó)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)品牌。

　　It is unlikely that Tencent or Alibaba will displace Facebook (WA, Insta, Messenger) or Amazon with their core offerings today.

　　這不像騰訊或者阿里用他們的核心服務(wù)擠走Facabook和亞馬遜。

　　However, what would a world look like where Alibaba or Tencent acquired Snapchat (again they are already investors)? The implications of a Chinese company having control over a communication and media platform with ubiquitous scale and engagement in the US would be unique

　　然后如果阿里和騰訊收購(gòu)了Snapchat公司世界會(huì)變成什么樣?中國(guó)公司的影響力將以超大的規(guī)模掌控美國(guó)通信和媒體平臺(tái)，成為美國(guó)市場(chǎng)的寡頭。

　　Playbook E: US restricts Chinese Internet Operations (or acquisitions) in the US:

　　劇本E：美國(guó)限制中國(guó)在美國(guó)的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)運(yùn)營(yíng)和并購(gòu)。

　　The Chinese government has been stifling US internet company penetration for years and the strategy has enabled Chinese Internet companies to flourish

　　中國(guó)政府已經(jīng)封鎖美國(guó)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司好幾年了，并且這項(xiàng)政策使得中國(guó)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司蓬勃發(fā)展。

　　Beyond the cultural challenges, the Chinese government is making it next to impossible for our brands (Facebook, Google, Twitter, LinkedIn) to exist in China.

　　除了文化挑戰(zhàn)，中國(guó)政府幾乎使得美國(guó)品牌不可能在中國(guó)生存，如Facebook、谷歌、Twitter、領(lǐng)英。

　　As China’s threat toward US internet penetration grows, perhaps the US government adopts a similarly restrictive stance (it has not done so today, but Chinese internet companies are not yet a threat to US based companies).

　　在當(dāng)中國(guó)對(duì)美國(guó)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)產(chǎn)業(yè)滲透加速的同時(shí)，可能美國(guó)政府也采用了類似的限制性態(tài)度。(可能目前還沒采取，是因?yàn)橹袊?guó)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司對(duì)美國(guó)基礎(chǔ)公司還不是威脅)

　　All this said, if DJI is any early indicator (the most innovative and formidable Chinese brand in the US), the US might continue sit back and let a Chinese branded consumer platform dominate our market.

　　所有一切表明，如果美國(guó)政府繼續(xù)觀望，那么很有可能帶有中國(guó)烙印的消費(fèi)平臺(tái)將控制我們的市場(chǎng)。

　　Potential Chinese Playbook F: China has the first Trillion $ Internet Company, the US follows

　　可能的中國(guó)劇本F：中國(guó)擁有了第一個(gè)萬億美元的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司，美國(guó)緊隨其后。

　　(I am not counting Apple as an internet company, but that is a discussion for a different day): It is likely the first trillion dollar internet company owns both China and the US (2 largest smartphone subscriber bases in world).

　　如果出現(xiàn)，它很有可能是第一個(gè)中美共同擁有的價(jià)值萬億美元的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司。(試想一下兩個(gè)在世界上擁有智能手機(jī)用戶最多的國(guó)家)

　　Given Chinese government censorship of US internet companies and the US openness toward Chinese internet investments / operations , it would seems as though there is a higher probability that a Chinese company wins in the US as compared to a US company winning in China.

　　但美國(guó)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司要經(jīng)過中國(guó)審查機(jī)構(gòu)審查，而中國(guó)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司面對(duì)的是美國(guó)開放。這看起來很有可能中國(guó)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司在美國(guó)比美國(guó)互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司在中國(guó)更容易獲得成功。