美日無(wú)法用TPP遏制中國(guó).

　　奧巴馬(Barack Obama)為何如此迫切地希望達(dá)成《跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系》(Trans-Pacific Partnership，簡(jiǎn)稱(chēng)TPP)貿(mào)易協(xié)定?啰嗦的官方答案是，這位美國(guó)總統(tǒng)認(rèn)為該協(xié)定將打破12個(gè)太平洋主要經(jīng)濟(jì)體之間的壁壘，并由此促進(jìn)繁榮。簡(jiǎn)短而真實(shí)的答案是：中國(guó)。為何這么說(shuō)呢?詳細(xì)請(qǐng)看下面的雙語(yǔ)新聞：

　　The crucial fact about the TPP is that it is a trade deal that would include the US, Japan and 10 other Pacific-rim economies — but exclude China. Much of the Washington controversy surrounding the TPP is the standard stuff thrown up by trade negotiations: arguments about farmers, currency and intellectual property. But the underlying motivations of Mr Obama and Shinzo Abe, the Japanese prime minister, are strategic.關(guān)于TPP的關(guān)鍵性事實(shí)在于，這是一個(gè)將包含美國(guó)、日本以及另外10個(gè)環(huán)太平洋經(jīng)濟(jì)體的貿(mào)易協(xié)定——但將中國(guó)排除在外。華盛頓方面圍繞TPP的大量爭(zhēng)論，是貿(mào)易談判拋出的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)內(nèi)容：關(guān)于農(nóng)民、匯率以及知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)的爭(zhēng)論。但是奧巴馬和日本首相安倍晉三(Shinzo Abe)的根本動(dòng)機(jī)是戰(zhàn)略性的。

　　Unfortunately for Washington and Tokyo, however, the TPP — even if it happens — is not a significant enough step to justify all the geopolitical hopes invested in it.然而，對(duì)于華盛頓和東京方面而言不幸的是，即使真的達(dá)成，TPP也沒(méi)有重要到足以證明：它被寄予的所有地緣政治希望都是合理的。

　　Debating the strategic logic behind the TPP has been difficult because, until recently, the US has not been frank about the reasons for China’s exclusion. The official line is that the Chinese economy is just not open enough to merit inclusion. A couple of weeks ago, however, Mr Obama came closer to acknowledging that the TPP is about much more than trade when he told The Wall Street Journal that it was crucial to get the deal because: “If we don’t write the rules, China will write the rules?.?.?.?We will be shut out?.?.?.?We don’t want China to use its size to muscle other countries in the region.”很難去爭(zhēng)論TPP背后的戰(zhàn)略邏輯，因?yàn)槊绹?guó)直到最近仍然沒(méi)有坦白說(shuō)出將中國(guó)排除在外的原因。官方說(shuō)法是，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的開(kāi)放程度不足以被納入TPP。然而，幾周前當(dāng)奧巴馬接受《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》(Wall Street Journal)采訪時(shí)，他距離承認(rèn)TPP遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)貿(mào)易范疇靠近了一步。在這次采訪中，奧巴馬表示，達(dá)成TPP協(xié)定至關(guān)重要，因?yàn)椤叭绻覀儾恢贫ㄒ?guī)則，中國(guó)將制定規(guī)則……我們就會(huì)被排斥在外……我們不希望中國(guó)利用其規(guī)模來(lái)強(qiáng)迫該地區(qū)的其他國(guó)家”。

　　Mr Obama still framed the argument in economic terms. But others in the US foreign policy establishment are willing to spell out the broader issues of power politics. A much-discussed recent report for the Council on Foreign Relations argued that decades of fort by America to “integrate China into the liberal international order” had in fect backfired because China’s power now threatened US “primacy in Asia”. Robert Blackwill and Ashley Tellis, the report’s authors and two of America’s most prominent Asia-watchers, argue for various measures to push back, including “new prerential trading arrangements among US friends and allies?.?.?.?through instruments that consciously exclude China”. That is a description of the TPP.奧巴馬仍然把爭(zhēng)論框定在經(jīng)濟(jì)范疇內(nèi)。但是美國(guó)外交政策當(dāng)局的其他人很樂(lè)意談及更廣泛的權(quán)力政治問(wèn)題。美國(guó)外交關(guān)系委員會(huì)(Council on Foreign Relations)最近一份廣受討論的報(bào)告認(rèn)為，過(guò)去幾十年美國(guó)“將中國(guó)融入自由國(guó)際秩序”的努力實(shí)際上適得其反，因?yàn)橹袊?guó)勢(shì)力如今威脅到美國(guó)“在亞洲的主導(dǎo)地位”。該報(bào)告的作者羅伯特?布萊克威爾(Robert Blackwill)和阿什利?泰利斯(Ashley Tellis)是美國(guó)兩名最著名的亞洲觀察人士。他們認(rèn)為美國(guó)應(yīng)該采取多種措施反擊，包括“通過(guò)有意識(shí)地將中國(guó)排除在外的手段……在美國(guó)的朋友和盟國(guó)之間建立新的特惠貿(mào)易安排”。這就是在描述TPP。

　　This strategic motivation is even more powerful for Japan, which is embroiled in bitter territorial and diplomatic disputes with China. Initially, Tokyo steered clear of the TPP negotiations to avoid upsetting powerful domestic constituencies. But Mr Abe’s fear of the rise of China has trumped his fear of Japanese farmers. He has come to see the TPP as crucial to strengthening the US-Japan alliance and its role in Asia. In a recent speech to the US Congress, the Japanese leader argued that the agreement was ultimately about “democracy and freedom”, adding:“Its strategic value is awesome.”對(duì)于與中國(guó)卷入激烈的領(lǐng)土和外交爭(zhēng)端的日本來(lái)說(shuō)，這種戰(zhàn)略動(dòng)機(jī)甚至更強(qiáng)。起初，東京方面回避TPP談判以避免惹惱強(qiáng)大的國(guó)內(nèi)選民。但是，安倍對(duì)中國(guó)崛起的恐懼超過(guò)了對(duì)日本農(nóng)民的畏懼。他開(kāi)始把TPP視為加強(qiáng)美日聯(lián)盟以及鞏固日本在亞洲地位的關(guān)鍵。最近在美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)發(fā)表演講時(shí)，這位日本領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人指出，該協(xié)定從根本上是關(guān)于“民主和自由”，并補(bǔ)充稱(chēng)：“其戰(zhàn)略?xún)r(jià)值是超乎尋常的?！?/p>

　　The notes of anxiety in these pleas by the US and Japanese leaders rlects the fact that both Washington and Tokyo fear China is on the march in Asia. While the direct territorial dispute between Japan and China has cooled down a little, Chinese claims in the South China Sea are being pushed with renewed energy through controversial “l(fā)and reclamation” projects, with clear military implications. On the economic front, America’s recent failure to prevent important allies from joining a China-sponsored Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank turned into a humiliation for the US. It now fears that the AIIB could become the instrument for promoting China’s policy of “one belt, one road” — the fort to build new infrastructure networks across the Asia- Pacific region, which centres on China.美國(guó)和日本領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人所作辯解中的焦慮情緒，反映了美方和日方均擔(dān)心中國(guó)在亞洲崛起的事實(shí)。盡管中日之間直接的領(lǐng)土爭(zhēng)端略微降溫，但中國(guó)在南中國(guó)海的領(lǐng)土主張，已經(jīng)通過(guò)備受爭(zhēng)議而帶有明顯軍事意味的“填海造島”工程而注入了新的動(dòng)力。在經(jīng)濟(jì)方面，美國(guó)最近未能阻止其重要盟友加入中國(guó)發(fā)起的亞洲基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資銀行(AIIB，簡(jiǎn)稱(chēng)亞投行)，此事令美國(guó)蒙羞。如今美國(guó)擔(dān)心亞投行將成為中國(guó)推動(dòng)其“一帶一路”政策的工具，而該政策是為了在以中國(guó)為中心的亞太地區(qū)打造全新基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施網(wǎng)。

　　Faced with these setbacks, the Obama administration is now determined to secure the TPP as a visible sign of US influence in the Asia-Pacific region. The president has made a “rebalance” to Asia one of his signature initiatives in foreign policy. His senior officials now accept that the TPP has become critical to signalling that the rebalance is alive and well.面對(duì)這些挫折，眼下奧巴馬當(dāng)局決心要達(dá)成TPP，作為美國(guó)在亞太地區(qū)影響力的明顯標(biāo)志。奧巴馬已經(jīng)把向亞洲“重新平衡”作為其外交政策的一項(xiàng)標(biāo)志性舉措。其高級(jí)官員如今認(rèn)為，對(duì)于表明這種重新平衡策略仍然存在并運(yùn)行良好，TPP至關(guān)重要。

　　However, the TPP cannot really meet the strategic hopes that are now pinned on it. First, it is still far from clear that the 12 countries involved will be able both to strike a deal and secure approval at home. Mr Obama’s struggles with Congress give due warning.然而，TPP無(wú)法真正滿(mǎn)足其如今被賦予的戰(zhàn)略希望。首先，TPP涉及的12個(gè)談判國(guó)能否達(dá)成協(xié)定并在各國(guó)國(guó)內(nèi)獲得通過(guò)，仍遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)不明朗。奧巴馬與國(guó)會(huì)的糾纏已經(jīng)發(fā)出了充分的警告。

　　More important, it is too late to prevent China becoming the core of the Asian economy — with all the political and strategic gains that implies. China更重要的是，現(xiàn)在阻止中國(guó)成為亞洲經(jīng)濟(jì)的核心為時(shí)已晚——考慮到其中蘊(yùn)含的所有政治和戰(zhàn)略利益。中國(guó)已經(jīng)成為T(mén)PP談判國(guó)中多數(shù)重要國(guó)家(包括日本、新加坡和澳大利亞)最大的貿(mào)易伙伴，而且中國(guó)還是美國(guó)本身的第二大貿(mào)易伙伴。中國(guó)還是韓國(guó)和印度最大的貿(mào)易伙伴，這兩個(gè)亞洲主要經(jīng)濟(jì)體甚至不是TPP談判方。的確，上周在奧巴馬竭力確保TPP在國(guó)會(huì)通過(guò)時(shí)，印度總理納倫德拉?莫迪(Narendra Modi)正在中國(guó)簽署總值220億美元的商業(yè)協(xié)議。

　　is already the biggest trading partner莫迪渴望與中國(guó)做生意，并不意味著印度對(duì)中國(guó)崛起完全釋?xiě)?。正如美?guó)在該地區(qū)的多數(shù)友國(guó)和盟友一樣，印度正慫恿美國(guó)加強(qiáng)在亞洲的軍事存在。但是，盡管美國(guó)仍然是亞太地區(qū)占主導(dǎo)地位的軍事強(qiáng)國(guó)，但中國(guó)如今是該地區(qū)實(shí)力超群的經(jīng)濟(jì)強(qiáng)國(guó)。一個(gè)TPP協(xié)定不足以、也來(lái)不及改變這一點(diǎn)了。

　　of most of the important nations in the TPP negotiations — including Japan, Singapore and Australia — and it is the second-biggest partner of the US itself. China is also the biggest trade partner of South Korea and India — two leading Asian economies that are not even譯者/馬柯斯

　　parties to the TPP negotiations. Indeed last week, as Mr Obama was struggling to keep the TPP alive in Congress, Narendra Modi, the Indian prime minister, was in China, signing $22bn of business deals.

　　Mr Modi’s eagerness to do business with China does not mean that India is completely at ease with the country’s rise. Like most of America’s friends and allies in the region, India is encouraging the US to step up its military presence in Asia. But while the US is still the dominant military power in the Asia-Pacific region, China is now the pre-eminent economic power. A TPP deal would do too little, too late to change that.