中國應(yīng)要求官員公布財產(chǎn)?.

　　近期美國的FT社評論表明，中國政府應(yīng)要求官員公布財產(chǎn)，這樣就可以直接找到腐敗人員，從而快速達(dá)到反腐倡廉的目的。那么中國的官員們到底需要公布財產(chǎn)嗎?政府恐怕不會打草驚蛇的，請看下面的詳細(xì)情況：

　　Since Xi Jinping became general secretary of the Communist party in November 2012, China has been convulsed by the biggest anti-corruption drive in its post-1949 history. Nearly 63,000 party officials have been punished, including more than 30 very senior figures. Almost 70 officials under investigation have committed suicide. The campaign reached a new crescendo when, after months of rumours, a formal investigation was launched into Zhou Yongkang, until 2012 a member of the nine-man Standing Committee that runs China.自習(xí)近平在2012年11月出任中共中央總書記以來，中國掀起了1949年以來最大規(guī)模的反腐敗運(yùn)動。近6.3萬名黨政官員被查處，其中包括30余名非常高層的人物。近70名受到調(diào)查的官員自殺。在傳言持續(xù)了幾個月之后，直到2012年還躋身于中國最高權(quán)力核心、身為中共中央政治局九名常委之一的周永康被正式立案審查，使反腐敗運(yùn)動達(dá)到一個新的高潮。

　　It is hard to exaggerate the significance of Mr Zhou’s detention. Until he retired in 2012, the former head of state security was one of the most powerful men in China. A former boss of the state-run China National Petroleum Corp, he had huge sway over the oil industry.很難夸大周永康被拘留的意義。在他于2012年退休之前，這名前中央政法委書記是中國最有權(quán)力的男人之一。作為國營的中國石油天然氣集團(tuán)公司(CNPC)的前任老板，他在石油行業(yè)也曾有過巨大的影響力。

　　His investigation breaks an important taboo. For 25 years, current or former members of the Standing Committee have been spared prosecution. Now the gloves are off. The question is: why? On the face of it, Mr Xi’s actions deserve applause. They have certainly proved popular with Chinese people, who this week flooded the internet with messages of support for the president’s all-out assault. The Communist party is riddled with corruption, putting a serious strain on its legitimacy. Bringing down an untouchable like Mr Zhou sends a message to the Chinese public that the party is serious about cleaning house.他被審查打破了一個重要的禁忌。在25年期間，中共中央政治局的現(xiàn)任或前任常委從無一人被提起公訴。現(xiàn)在，這種“免死金牌”已被剝奪。問題是：為什么?就事論事，習(xí)近平的行動應(yīng)該得到掌聲和歡呼。這些行動肯定得到中國普通人的擁護(hù)，近日互聯(lián)網(wǎng)上滿是支持中國國家主席重拳反腐的言論。中國共產(chǎn)黨內(nèi)充斥著腐敗，這使黨對自身的執(zhí)政合法性難以自圓其說。扳倒一個周永康這樣的“碰不得”人物，無異于向中國公眾發(fā)出了一個信號：黨對于清理門戶是認(rèn)真的。

　　Indeed, Mr Xi’s actions have sent a chill across the bureaucracy. Bribe-taking and influence-peddling are so common there must be thousands of cadres who jump every time there’s an unexpected knock at the door. Officials are even scared to be seen dining in expensive restaurants or wearing fancy watches.的確，習(xí)近平的行動使整個官僚體系戰(zhàn)戰(zhàn)兢兢。受賄和以權(quán)謀私如此普遍，以至于現(xiàn)在肯定有成千上萬的干部聽到意想不到的敲門聲就會心慌。官員們甚至害怕被人看到在昂貴的餐廳進(jìn)餐或者佩戴名表。

　　Yet the campaign is not all it seems. The way justice is dispensed in China undermines the claim that this is an even-handed exercise. Courts are not independent, but answer to the Communist party. Judgments are often reached behind closed doors. Conviction rates are above 99 per cent.然而，這場運(yùn)動的背后另有玄機(jī)。中國司法運(yùn)作的方式讓人難以相信這是一場不偏不倚的運(yùn)動。法院不是獨(dú)立的，而是要向共產(chǎn)黨匯報。判決往往在幕后做出。定罪率在99%以上。

　　Even if Mr Xi is genuine about tackling corruption, the suspicion is his allies will not be touched. His adversaries, on the other hand, are far from safe. Mr Zhou may have paid the price for being associated with Bo Xilai, the former party secretary of Chongqing who was once considered a rival to Mr Xi. Mr Bo was sentenced to life imprisonment for corruption last year. Even bigger heads could roll. Some sort of backlash against Mr Xi cannot be ruled out.即使習(xí)近平真心反腐，人們也懷疑他的盟友將不會被波及。而他的對手則難以自保。周永康可能是因為與薄熙來結(jié)盟而付出了代價。薄熙來是原重慶市委書記，一度被視為習(xí)近平的政治對手，他在去年因腐敗罪被判處無期徒刑。就是更加位高權(quán)重的人物也可能倒臺。不能排除習(xí)近平遭到某種反彈的可能性。

　　One theory is that the president is attacking vested interests as a prelude to radical economic rorm. There is a chance that next will come a sustained assault on the bloated state-owned enterprises. Not only have these become a piggy bank for corrupt officials. They are also responsible for much of the investment – some of it wasted – that must be curbed if China is to rebalance its economy. It may be that Mr Xi is planning to use his anti-corruption drive as a springboard for getting these enterprises in order. That, however, is guesswork. Just as likely, the main motive is the consolidation of his own power and the preservation of a Communist party whose reputation has been eaten away by the public perception of corruption.有一種說法是，中國國家主席正在打擊既得利益集團(tuán)，作為大膽經(jīng)濟(jì)改革的前奏。接下來臃腫的國有企業(yè)有可能面對持續(xù)的沖擊。國企部門不僅成了貪官的小金庫，還要對很大一部分的過度投資負(fù)責(zé)——其中很多投資是浪費(fèi)的——如果中國要調(diào)整經(jīng)濟(jì)結(jié)構(gòu)，就必須遏制這些投資行為。也許習(xí)近平計劃利用他的反腐敗運(yùn)動作為一個跳板，推動這些企業(yè)走上正軌。然而，這只是猜測。同樣有可能的是，他的主要動機(jī)是鞏固自己的權(quán)力，維護(hù)共產(chǎn)黨的統(tǒng)治;黨的聲譽(yù)已被公眾眼中的腐敗形象嚴(yán)重破壞。

　　If Mr Xi is as serious as his supporters claim about fighting corruption, there is one thing he could do. He should stipulate that all officials, including the most senior ones, disclose their assets. That would help flush out any suspicious activity. In reality, the Communist party has resisted such steps. In June, three activists were handed down heavy jail sentences for demanding precisely that. Until they are released and their demands met, it would not be wise to take the anti-corruption drive at face value.如果習(xí)近平對反腐真有他的支持者所稱的那么認(rèn)真，那么，有一件事是他可以做的。他應(yīng)該規(guī)定所有官員——包括最高層的官員——披露自己的資產(chǎn)。這將有助于曝光任何可疑的活動。但在現(xiàn)實中，中共一直在抵制此類措施。今年6月，三名活動人士正是因為要求官員申報資產(chǎn)而被判重刑。在他們獲釋、他們的訴求得到積極響應(yīng)之前，我們在看待這場反腐敗運(yùn)動時不能停留在表面。